Elliot d cohen biography of abraham lincoln

Former State Department Counsellor Eliot Cohen on how William Shakespeare can explain the rise, rule, and fall of present day leaders.

Elliot D. Cohen, PhD, is professor and chair of the department of humanities at Indian River State College, adjunct professor of clinical ethics at the Florida.

In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen examines four supreme commanders in several pivotal conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries: U.S. President Abraham.

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Cohen, Eliot A(sher) 1956-

PERSONAL: Born April 3, 1956, in Boston, MA; son of Felix M. (a physician) and Frieda S. Cohen; married Judith G. Rosenberg, June 26, 1977; children: Raphael, Michal, Rebecca. Education:Harvard University, B.A. (magna cum laude), 1977, M.A., 1979, Ph.D., 1982.

ADDRESSES: Office—Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, MD 21218. E-mail—[email protected].

CAREER:Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, assistant professor of government and Allston Burr Senior Tutor in Quincy House, 1982-86; U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, visiting professor, 1985-86, Secretary of the Navy senior research fellow, beginning 1986; Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, professor of strategic studies. Military service: U.S. Army Reserve, 1982—; became second lieutenant.

MEMBER: International Institute for Strategic Studies, American Political Science Association, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

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A Quintessential Factor in Strategy Formulation: The Unequal Dialogue
Arnel P. David
- Joint Advanced Warfighting School, USA
By U.S. Air Force Photo/Staff Sgt. Eric Harris - Public Domain, Wikipedia Commons
To cite this article: David, Arnel P., “A Quintessential Factor in Strategy Formulation: The Unequal Dialogue,” Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 8, Issue 4, spring 2023, pages 11-15.
Colonel Arnel P. David is a US Army Strategist attending the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. He is a graduate of the Local Dynamics of War Scholars Program at the Command and General Staff College and is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London. He has a mix of six conventional and special operations combat deployments to the Middle East, Pacific, and Central Asia. His books include Military Strategy in the 21st Century (2018) and Warrior Diplomats (2023). He is a co-founder of Fight Club International.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own
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The Unequal Dialogue: Just How Unequal Is It?
In Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot A. Cohen makes a strong and correct case that the dialogue between senior political and military leaders is “unequal.” The basis for this inequality is the unequivocal fact that in democracies, senior political leaders, the president, and, in the U.S., the secretary of defense, have final decision authority. After four case studies—Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War, Georges Clemenceau during World War I, Winston Churchill in World War II and David Ben-Gurion during the Arab-Israeli War—Cohen concludes “that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned—indeed, in all cases stronger at the end of a war than it had been at the beginning.” The question I would like to pose, however, is this: While Cohen’s argument is correct, is it complete—at least with respect to wartime leadership?
Without doubt, the argument in Supreme Command is